

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS ON MEDIATION BEHAVIOR

by

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THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS ON MEDIATION BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

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Keywords: Mediation, international conflict, foreign policy, domestic politics.

Why do states intervene in other countries' conflicts as mediators? The main answer to this question in the mediation literature is that states care about conflict outcomes and mediation is an attempt to influence these outcomes. In this thesis, I argue that domestic political conditions in a country also have an effect on its likelihood of attempting mediation. I propose that leaders are more likely to become a mediator when they feel vulnerable because of poor performance in domestic politics or economy. More specifically, I expect politically vulnerable leaders to use mediation as a tool to raise their domestic popularity. I test the plausibility of this prediction by conducting linear regression analysis on how domestic political factors affect OECD countries' mediation attempts between 1950 and 2000. I do not find consistent evidence of a relationship between mediation attempts and domestic factors. Instead, the results show that mediation attempts become less likely when domestic conditions are poorer. Although the findings are contrary to my hypotheses, this thesis contributes to the literature by showing that countries that are stronger in economic, military and, political terms are more likely to become mediators.

ÖZET

İÇ SİYASAL FAKTÖRLERİN ARABULUCULUK FAALİYETLERİ ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ

ESRA BİÇER

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculuk, uluslararası uyuşmazlık, dış politika, iç politika.

Devletler neden diğer ülkelerin uyuşmazlıklarına arabuluculuk yaparlar? Arabuluculuk literatüründeki bu sorunun ana cevabı, devletlerin uyuşmazlıkların sonuçlarını önemseydiği ve arabuluculuğun bu sonuçları etkilemek için bir girişim olduğu yönündedir. Bu tezde, bir ülkedeki iç siyasi koşulların ülkenin arabuluculuk yapma kapasitesini ve istekliliğini etkilediği iddia edilmiştir. Ülkelerdeki liderlerin iç siyasi performansları göz önüne alındığında, kendilerini siyasi olarak zayıf gören liderlerin, arabulucu olarak dış politikada varlık göstermeye daha yatkın oldukları önerilmektedir. Liderler dış politika faaliyetlerini siyasi pozisyonlarını korumak adına bir araç olarak kullanmaya eğilimli oldukları için, arabuluculuğu da bir siyasi başarı örneği olarak kullanabilecekleri öngörülmüştür. Bu önerinin güvenilirliğini test etmek adına 1950-2000 yılları arasında OECD ülkelerinin arabuluculuk girişimlerinin iç siyasi faktörlerden nasıl etkilendiği üzerine doğrusal regresyon analizi yapılmıştır. Bu tezde arabuluculuk faaliyeti ve iç siyasi koşullar arasında bir ilişki tespit edilememiştir. Bunun yerine bu tezde bulunan sonuçlar, iç siyasi koşullar liderlerin siyasi performansının düşük olduğunu göstermesi durumunda arabuluculuk faaliyetine katılma oranının düştüğünü göstermektedir. Her ne kadar sonuçlar hipotezleri desteklemese de bu tez, ülkelerin ekonomik, askeri ve siyasi bakımından güçlü olmasının, arabulucu ülke olma ihtimalini güçlendirdiğini göstererek literatüre katkı sağlamıştır.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
THIRD PARTY MEDIATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW.....	3
THEORY: FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS TO MEDIATION ACTIVITIES.....	13
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN.....	17
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS.....	23
CONCLUSION.....	50
REFERENCES.....	52

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Mediator Rank and Position List from ICM dataset.....	19
Table 2: Mediation Strategy List from ICM Dataset.....	20
Table 3: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth.....	29
Table 4: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election.....	30
Table 5: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Dem.....	31
Table 6: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables.....	32
Table 7: Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth.....	34
Table 8: Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations.....	35
Table 9: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA.....	37
Table 10: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election Excluding the USA.....	38
Table 11: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Dem. Excluding the USA.....	39
Table 12: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding the USA.....	40
Table 13: Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA.....	41
Table 14: Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations Excluding the USA.....	42
Table 15: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Democratic Countries.....	44
Table 16: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Presidential Regimes.....	45
Table 17: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Parliamentary Regimes.....	46
Table 18: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in USA, UK and France.....	47
Table 19: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding USA, UK and France.....	48

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Coercive and non-Coercive Third-Party Intervention.....	5
Figure 2: Conflict Management Types by Percentage.....	6
Figure 3: The Frequency of State-led Mediation and Disputes.....	9
Figure 4: Total Number of Mediations by Countries.....	24
Figure 5: Total Number of Mediations by Decades.....	24
Figure 6: Total Number of Mediations by Regions.....	25
Figure 7a: % of All Countries, % of Mediation Attempts.....	26
Figure 7b: % of All Countries, % of Mediation Attempts (Excluding the USA).....	26
Figure 8: The number of Mediations, The Number of Anti-Gov. Demonstrations.....	27

INTRODUCTION

Third-party mediation has become the most preferred conflict prevention and resolution method after the end of the Cold War (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Frazier & Dixon, 2009; Nagel & Clayton, 2017). Individuals, states and governmental and non-governmental organizations can take part in the conflict resolution process as mediating parties. However, states are the most common type of mediators in international dispute resolution (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Greig & Diehl, 2012). There are many arguments about the motivations of states for engaging in international conflicts as a third-party mediator. Zartman and Touval (2001) argues that although third parties intend to ensure peace, their main driving motive is their self-interests. Touval (2003) claims that although countries intend to bring peace for the conflict, success of peaceful settlement in mediation is usually a secondary consideration for them. Greig and Reagon (2008) found that the probability of state-led mediation increases if states believe that they will have some benefits in the outcome. States may pursue a variety of goals: to keep stability/balance in the region, to have important role in future relations with conflicting parties or, to reduce spillover-effects that directly affect neighboring regions.

In this study, I explore whether a leader's domestic political interests influence his or her country's mediation attempts. The literature on international conflict recognizes leaders' domestic political incentives as an important factor. Leaders are inclined to use foreign policy for their own political survival (Putnam, 1988). In particular, if political leaders display a poor domestic political performance, they need to have a successful record in international affairs to compensate for it. Accordingly, leaders tend to use foreign policy activities as tools for achieving their domestic political outcomes. In the literature, mostly the political use of force has been studied as a foreign policy tool. However, third-party mediation which is initiated for political purposes of leaders has

been overlooked by scholars. Touval (2003) suggests that mediation studies need to evaluate mediation as part of foreign policy to understand leaders' strategic actions better within the international and domestic political systems.

Todhunter (2012) applies this idea to the US context and argues that when US presidents feel vulnerable in domestic politics and there is a strong opposition in the Congress, they are more inclined to engage in mediation. He finds evidence for his argument by analyzing US mediation attempts between 1945 and 1995.

In my study, my goal is to evaluate the validity of Todhunter's argument for a broader range of countries and years. I examine third-party mediation as a foreign policy strategy that is shaped by domestic politics and specifically argue that leaders are more likely to engage in mediation in order to cover their poor domestic political performance. The main research question of my study is whether the domestic political situation in a country affects its mediation attempts. I examine mediation attempts by OECD countries between 1950 and 2000 and study the link between domestic political factors and international mediation attempts. Specifically, I analyze economic performance, election cycle and, public approval as key aspects of domestic politics.

In this study, I do not find strong support for a relationship between domestic political factors and state mediation. My analyses do not provide evidence that leaders who feel vulnerable domestically tend to become a mediator in international conflicts. What I find is that if there is strong public dissatisfaction against a government, then its leader is *less* likely to attempt mediation. In addition, I find that major powers and countries that are stronger militarily and economically are more likely to attempt mediation.

This study proceeds as follows: In the next section, I present a brief summary of previous literature on the third-party mediation and explain my theory. The third section provides a discussion of my research design, dataset and my statistical analyses. In the fourth section, main results of my analyses are presented. In the final chapter I conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications.

THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review the existing literature on when there is a need for third-party involvement and when states are inclined to be a mediator.

The nature and diversity of international conflicts have changed over time. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts, the number of international crises and the number of genocides have declined (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). However, we see a dramatic rise of intrastate conflict in the post-World War II era (Conflict type data from UCDP 2017.)¹. The rise of intrastate conflict has forced scholars to modify the meaning of international conflict by adding internationalized intrastate conflict in the definition (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). Internationalized intrastate conflict refers to civil wars in which outside intervention is involved. In this thesis, I focus on mediation attempts in both interstate and internationalized intrastate conflicts.

Conflict resolution has become a popular field after the Cold War era; we have seen more effort to solve international problems and more concern with maintaining international security (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). In the Cold War era, the international system saw the world through the eyes of Realism. Therefore, state sovereignty and their interests were priority in the conflict resolution, and there was no attention on non-state actors. After the end of bipolar world order, human security came to the forefront. Hence, shifts in the nature of international politics require diversity of conflict resolution perspectives (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b). Conflict resolution tactics can range from softer methods like talking, negotiating, mediating, to more coercive methods like economic, political or even military force.

¹ http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/667/c_667494-l_1-k_armed-conflict-by-type--1946-2016.pdf, 16.10.2017.

In a state-centric Westphalian System, negotiation was the most preferred conflict resolution tool (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a, p. 8). Negotiation involves direct communication between two or more opposing parties to settle a mutually acceptable agreement without the presence of a third-party facilitator. However, third-party intervention has become increasingly common after the Cold War period. In Figure 1, we can see that third-party interventions can vary from arbitration to coercive and non-coercive mediation. Arbitration is “the voluntary submission of a dispute to a third party for settlement by the making of an award which will bind the parties” (Wallace-Bruce, 1998, p. 63). The arbitrator is the most powerful third-party role because after a careful examination of both party’s evidence, the final decision is declared by an arbitrator and the decision is binding and cannot be appealed. Apart from the arbitration, there is another international law-based and binding form of third-party intervention, which is adjudication or judicial settlement. The main difference between adjudication and arbitration is arbitration tends to be on an ad hoc basis, while in adjudication, the process is managed by an existing established international body like the International Court of Justice or European Court of Human Rights. However, both intervention models solve conflicts according to established international legal principles (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001, pp. 47-55).




Figure 1: Coercive and non-coercive third-party intervention²

Definition and Functions of Mediation

In this study, I am concerned primarily with *mediation*, which is one of the non-violent ways of conflict management by third-parties. Bercovitch emphasized in his book that mediation is the most effective conflict resolution method in the twenty-first century and, “by far the most common form of peaceful third-party intervention in international conflicts” (Jacob Bercovitch, 1984, p. 131; Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 5). There was a 64 percent increase in the number of mediation attempts in the 1990s, when compared to 1945-1989 (Greig & Diehl, 2012). In addition, Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management Dataset shows that mediation was the preferred method in almost 60 percent of international disputes between 1945-2003 (Figure 2). The purpose of mediation is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable for both sides (Zartman & Touval, 1996). It is all voluntary agreement and the result is non-binding for parties (Raymond & Kegley, 1985, p. 34). There are plenty of definitions of mediation but they have a

² Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution', p. 23.

common core: related parties come together to understand needs and expectations of other sides and express their ideas to find a peaceful solution. Once mediation is accepted by the warring parties, the intervention method can be fairly passive by transferring information from one side to the other or active by offering promises of political and economic support (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 331). A mediator is able to increase the likelihood of transforming conflict structure, establishing mutual communication between conflicted parties, and understanding other party's interests and needs. This allows opponents to adopt a new peaceful approach towards each other and conflict itself (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012, pp. 224-230).




Figure 2: ICM, 1945-2003

In coercive mediation, the mediator uses powerful incentives, both carrots and sticks, to persuade parties to come to a settlement. We can give US President Jimmy Carter's mediation efforts in Camp David as an example of coercive mediation which can also be called as "power mediation" or "mediation with muscles" (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 9; Richmond, 2001, p. 58). He used the US resources of foreign aid and guaranteed security as a leverage for Israel and Egypt and he said he would withdraw the process if they failed to solve the dispute before the deadline he assigned (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012, p. 229). Softer methods such as conciliation, facilitation or problem-solving workshops can be classified as non-coercive mediations. In this kind of mediation, mediator can help information flow between parties, arrange discussion platforms, basically provide "good offices" for problem-solving and help adversaries to start negotiation process. In this type, the role of a mediator is to get the disputants to focus on underlying interests (the things

they really need or want) more than their initial opening positions (what they initially say they need or want).

Mediation has important advantages if we compare it with more legal or formal resolution methods. First, force is not used to pursue participants; it is a voluntary process so both parties can surpass the trust issue more than in other management options. They can easily accept the solution, which makes the solution more stable (Mitchell & Webb, 1988, p. 10). Second, mediator neither serves in favor of one side of a conflict nor is a direct participant to the ongoing disputes; the mediator is there to find a common ground that satisfies as many disputants as possible (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 18). Third, the outcome is not binding, opponents have a choice not to accept mediator's ideas. That is also well-suited to parties' needs to feel not threatened. Also, it is an ad hoc process, specific for just a particular case so it is flexible, parties can decide themselves about the ground rules. Moreover, underlying causes of conflict can become apparent because mediator is more flexible to meet with parties not publicly (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981). Lastly, mediation is less time consuming than long-standing and rigid legal processes.

There can be various reasons behind the willingness of conflicted parties to accept assistance from a third party. First reason might be that belligerent parties have reached a "hurting stalemate", which occurs when parties face a deadlock that none of them can win or lose and they need a third-party to find a solution (Zartman, 2000, p. 228). Second, they might realize that their gains from the cooperation will be more than their conflict-related loss (Beardsley, 2010; Jacob Bercovitch, 1984; Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Greig & Diehl, 2012). Apart from these reasons, one of the conflicted parties might seek a mediator with the expectation that mediator will justify their reasons for conflict (Jacob Bercovitch, 1984). In addition, parties might see mediation process as an expression of their justification to the international sphere and try to gain appreciation from other states for looking a peaceful solution (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b; Zartman, 2001).

Motives of Mediators

Deciding who will be a mediator is an important issue. There is a number of choices such as individuals, great, mid-size or small states, international or national organizations and, non-governmental organizations (Jacob Bercovitch, 2011; Vukovic, 2014). Every type of mediator has some advantages and disadvantages according to conflict's characteristics. For example, the most

flexible mediators are individual mediators because they do not have a responsibility to any government, so they seem like the most neutral ones. Generally, they use their status such as their business, academic or political background as a leverage (Todhunter, 2012, p. 35). President Carter's efforts in Camp David accord is one of a good example. Camp David Accords is the peace treaty, which make an end of three decades of hostilities between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Mostly individual mediators use communication and facilitation strategies (Jacob Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000, p. 147). However, individual mediators are not the dominant preference in international arena. In the last decade, institutions and organizations have become increasingly popular mediators. They use different techniques such as multi-track or track-II diplomacy.³ However, most of them lack political power and more often they focus on the socio-economic issues in the conflict. One of the unique advantages that they have is opponent parties approach them in a less suspicious way relative to state officials. United Nations, Amnesty International, Carter Center, African Union and, The International Committee of the Red Cross are examples of international and regional organization mediators. However, in this study, I focus on state mediators. Because of their economic and political capacity, states are most requested mediators by countries (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Greig & Diehl, 2012). Moreover, states are the most common initiators of mediation process by initiating roughly 50% of all mediations (J. Bercovitch & Fretter, 2007; Jacob Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). Lastly, focusing on state actors limits the scope of this thesis and makes the project more feasible.

In Figure 3, we can see that over the years both the number of disputes and state-led mediation increase, which means that state mediation and disputes have a close relationship. Even though their neutrality is questionable for parties, they need states' resources and leverage capacities when they cannot provide these resources themselves. Actors who mediate in the name of a state can vary from junior ministers and bureaucrats to high-level representatives including presidents, prime ministers, secretary of states, or foreign ministers (Nagel & Clayton, 2017).

³ Track II and multi-track approach to conflict resolution are unofficial and nongovernmental actions. The negotiations process can be managed by religious institutions, academics, former government officials, non-governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations or think tanks.




Figure 3: Molly, when states mediate (Data from ICM)

States have motivations to become a mediator other than just providing peace. States are rational actors in the international arena and calculate costs and benefits of their actions (M.Melin, 2013). If the cost of mediation process is higher than its benefit, it is unlikely that states would accept to engage in conflict resolution. (Beber, 2012, p. 406; Zartman, 2000, p. 156). Mostly, states are afraid of escalation and spill-over effect of conflict, which means conflict can circulate through the neighboring countries and pull more parties into the conflict (Collier, 2003; Gleditsch, 2007). Therefore, they prefer to initiate a mediation process to stop or, at least, to reduce the potential negative effects of conflict. In this regard, mediation efforts by states to manage crises after the dissolution of Yugoslavia can be a good example. The other reason might be that being a member state of a regional or an international organization lets a state to attempt mediation especially if the conflict occurred among the other members of the organization (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). The Turkish mediation attempts to the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, two Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) member-states, can be given as an example. Moreover, mediator state may aim to enhance its influence over the conflicted parties or to prevent its rivals from enhancing their influence by being a third-party. For example, Soviet mediation attempt to India-Pakistan conflict derived from the fear of China's occasion to extend its influence over Pakistan and become a threat to Soviets (Zartman, 2008, p. 157). In addition, mediation is less costly if we compare it with military actions and, domestic public opinion supports more peaceful processes because of increasing humanitarian concerns especially after the Cold War period

(Zartman, 2008, p. 158). All these reasons show us that states do not only approach the mediation purely to prove peace and stability in international politics. On the contrary, states are likely to be interested in being a mediator if they have care about the outcome.

This discussion brings me to the argument that mediation is a part of domestic and foreign policy and the success of mediation may be a secondary concern for states (Touval, 2003). Foreign policy actions are determined under the influence of national and international actors and practiced by government officials with the aim of achieving domestic and international objectives. When a leader decides on the foreign policy strategy, domestic factors constitute a big part of this framework. Putnam (1988) explains in his two-level game theory model that leaders who make decisions for political survival are affected by both international and domestic political spheres. The domestic factors that affect foreign policy decisions can be economic performance, national political institutions, societal structures, domestic oppositions or public awareness (Todhunter, 2012). Studies show that public is aware and interested in foreign policy affairs, and contrary to popular belief, and public opinion on foreign policy is a strong determinant of their voting behaviors (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006). Accordingly, Putnam (1988) claims that sometimes leaders use foreign policy to empower their domestic political standing. Moreover, studies suggest that this goal seems more important than anything else for a leader (de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005; Neustadt, 1964). Because the most important objective for a leader is political survival, they can use foreign policy as a tool to divert public attention from domestic problems by channeling patriotism (James & Oneal, 1991; Todhunter, 2012). In addition, although there are different camps in the government to stop a leader from making socio-economic initiatives, when it comes to foreign policy, interests of a state beyond the ideological lines (Schultz, 2001). However, literature generally focuses on political use of military force for explaining the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy actions (Foster, 2006; Levy, 1988; Meernik, 2001). Jentleson (1992) presents that public have the ability to calculate the potential risks to use of force. They act hesitantly in this regard and do not fully support this strategy. Therefore, governments tend to use non-military foreign policy options such as the provision of foreign aid, the use of sanctions or mediation. Mediation is a less costly, non-binding and, more peaceful activity than the other methods. It is less costly because mediation needs limited resources and poses no risk to the military force or lives of citizens. Thus, I suggest that third-party mediation is one of the attractive foreign policy options for countries to reach their political targets.

Especially, for governments that do not have many resources, mediation can be a good option for gaining some economic and political resources and earning a reputation as a peace maker in the international politics (M.Melin, 2013, p. 79; Zartman & Touval, 1996, p. 446). To be able to persuade the conflicted parties come to the same table and start the negotiation process may be seen as a of high-profile foreign policy success for a leader.

Gap in the Literature: A Foreign Policy Perspective on Mediation

Scholars studying on mediation criticize that mediation analyses adopting foreign policy perspective has been neglected in the literature (Touval, 2003). Most studies emphasize that mediation is a widely used strategy to reach a political achievement (Berovitch, 2002; Kleiboer, 2002), however, they do not provide consistent empirical findings. While the literature explores numerous arguments explaining when mediation occurs, how international mediation produces successful outcomes, and what external factors motivate states to engage in mediation process; only limited scholarship has explored when states are more likely to become a mediator regarding country's domestic politics. Touval (2003) also claims that perceiving mediation as a foreign policy tool means that strategies and goals of states during mediation processes are frequently shaped by concerns which are exogeneous to the conflict. In addition, (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009c) emphasize this view as key element in explaining the reasons why states are more likely to become a mediator.

Todhunter (2012) adopts this conceptual framework in his dissertation and claims that mediator's strategic move is effected by domestic political factors and leader's performance. The study argues when the government's feeling of domestic vulnerability increases, the number of mediation tend to increase. Because leaders are likely to be mediators when they assume that it is beneficial to cover up their poor domestic political performance and when government has a strong opposition in the assembly that restrains legislative power of government. He measures mediation attempts by looking at three different components: mediation initiatives by years, mediator types and mediator strategy. Mediator type means mediator's rank and position in the government. It gets media attention because the media focuses on high-level government officials' action in international politics. More media attention means more coverage of this action publicly. Mediator strategy is also an indicator of whether governments use this intervention for a long-term peace building or short-term benefit. His argument is mediators use more manipulative strategies to yield

the peace settlement quickly because they need short term results to use it for their own political survival especially when the elections are close. Todhunter measures domestic political performance and constraints by looking at economic performance, approval ratings from the public and, congressional opposition. He considers the election proximity as another measure because he thinks governments in power would like to preserve their places and mediation could be one strong incentive to help them to improve their domestic standing. He tests these hypotheses looking at the US mediation attempts between 1945 and 1995. The results support to the argument that domestic political conditions influence political leaders when they have an opportunity to engage in the mediation process. However, Todhunter's results are only applicable for powerful states with the presidential system because he only examines the US mediation attempts. A broader study is needed in the mediation literature. Inspired by Todhunter's study, this thesis attempts to examine the influence of domestic political conditions on the motives of mediator by referring OECD countries' mediation attempts.

THEORY: FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS TO MEDIATION ACTIVITIES

As discussed in the earlier section, mediation is the most popular type of conflict management method and powerful states are the most popular mediators (Jacob Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). There are many reasons for states to be a mediating party, however, the most notable and controversial one is that to pursue political achievements in international politics (Touval, 1992). Touval (2003) argues that international mediation can be a foreign policy which allows states to gain domestic and international support.

Following Todhunter (2012), mediation attempts of OECD countries are analyzed in this thesis by examining the number of mediation, mediator type, and mediation strategy. There are various domestic factors which might affect government foreign policy actions. GDP growth is the most appropriate and widely used indicator to measure government performance because it represents long-term national economic outputs. Although it is influenced by global issues, it is also highly influenced by government policies. People often hold the incumbent government responsible for poor economic performance and tend to punish them at the ballot box. There are many studies providing a support for the argument that economic conditions are very influential on voting behavior of citizens (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; Alvarez, Nagler, & Willette, 2000; Palmer & Whitten, 2000). Thus, when governments are challenged by poor economic performance, they incline to take foreign policy actions to divert their citizens' attention from economic issues (Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach, & Young, 1993). I use this rationale to propose the following hypothesis:

*H1a: States are more likely to **engage in mediation** if their GDP growth rate is declining.*

Consistent with the argument above, when a leader needs to divert public attention, media coverage plays an important role. Because mass media functions as a bridge between public and policymakers. It is the main source for public to gain information about foreign policy issues

(Soroka, 2003). As expected, high ranked officials such as presidents, prime ministers, secretary of states, or foreign ministers are likely to take media attention. Thus, I predict that governments send high-ranked officials to the mediation processes to take more attention from the media:

*H1b: States are more likely to **send high ranked representatives** to the mediation process if their GDP growth rate is declining.*

As I have discussed, because of political survival is the main concern for a leader, they are more likely to find short-term policy success when they face with domestic and international challenges. Yuen and Werner (2005) point out that third-party interventions where mediators use their power to manipulate opposing parties to make an end the conflict result in short-term peace building. Bear this finding in mind, one can assume when leaders feel vulnerable in domestic politics they tend to use manipulative strategies in mediation and I test this argument with below hypothesis:

*H1c: States are more likely to **use manipulative intervention strategies** if their GDP growth rate is declining.*

An upcoming election is an opportunity for the public to evaluate the government performance during its tenure. Rational behavior models suggest that in an election environment, citizens vote by calculating governments' failures and successes (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; Kramer, 1971). Thus, governments need to convince the public about their success in both domestic and foreign policy when election is close. Being a mediator might be a good political opportunity for governments which want to be reelected to demonstrate their power and dovishness. The literature suggests that political leaders abstain from using military force in their foreign policy actions when they are not confident about their likelihood of winning the next election (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003; Gaubatz, 1991; Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & J.D.Morrow, 2003). This can be a reason that they are more likely to adopt peaceful strategies in their foreign policy actions. In addition, I use the same logic with above hypotheses about mediator rank and strategy. It is expected that governments are more likely to announce their leadership in foreign policy through mass media coverage and to use manipulative strategies to reach a solution in a short time.

Therefore, considering these assumptions I reach my following hypotheses:

*H2a: States are more likely to **engage in mediation** if there will be an election in the coming year.*

*H2b: States are more likely to **send high ranked representatives** to the mediation process if there will be an election in the coming year.*

*H2c: States are more likely to **use manipulative intervention strategies** if there will be an election in the coming year.*

Another significant domestic factor that might affect government policies is public approval rates. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) found that if citizens appreciate government's foreign policy activities, they are more likely to give higher approval rates to the government. For this reason, I expect that leaders can benefit from foreign policy opportunities to avoid lower public approval rates due to their poor domestic performance. As there is no sufficient public approval data for all OECD countries, I include the number of anti-government demonstrations as a public approval indicator. This indicator displays public dissatisfaction about government's policies. As I argued regarding economic performance and elections, using higher mediator rank should increase media attention and manipulative strategies should provide short term result which are beneficial for leaders.

With this information above, following hypotheses are established:

*H3a: States are more likely to **engage in mediation** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations.*

*H3b: States are more likely to **send high ranked representatives** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations.*

*H3c: States are more likely to **use manipulative intervention strategies** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations.*

As it is stated before GDP growth is a good proxy for popularity of government. Moreover, if GDP growth rate is low and there is an election soon, I expect that government takes actions to improve its political standing and to keep its incumbent position. Otherwise, it is likely that government loses its popularity and this causes a failure in the election (Lewis-Beck, 1990). That's why I expect to find the interaction of these two variables will affect my dependent variables. I intend to analyze this interaction as below:

*H4a: States are more likely to **engage in mediation attempts** if GDP per capita growth rate is low and election is close.*

*H4b: States are more likely to **send high ranked representatives** if GDP per capita growth rate is low and election is close.*

*H4c: States are more likely to **use manipulative intervention strategies** if GDP per capita growth rate is low and election is close.*

Since governments seek to preserve their places, they concern about their public approval rates more when the election is close. Therefore, it is expected from governments to take some actions in order to increase their popularity in election time. Mediation can be a low-risk option to demonstrate their policy success. At least, it might be helpful to strengthen the idea that government is still powerful in international politics. Accordingly, I expect the given interaction will affect the frequency of mediation activity:

*H5a: States are more likely to **engage in mediation attempts** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations when election is close.*

*H5b: States are more likely to **send high ranked representatives** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations when election is close.*

*H5c: States are more likely to **use manipulative intervention strategies** if there are strong anti-government demonstrations when election is close.*

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, I describe my research design and present the logic for selecting my variables. First, the structure of dataset and how to test methodologically the relationship between domestic political situation and mediation attempts are explained. Second, key dependent, independent and control variables are discussed in detail.

The main goal of this study is to analyze the relationship between a country's domestic politics and its willingness to mediate conflicts in other countries. Primary argument is that leaders may attempt to use mediation when they feel vulnerable in domestic political environment in their country. To test this argument, 23 OECD countries' mediation attempts from 1950 until 2000 are examined on an annual basis. This time period is chosen because of data availability. Also, the scope of this analysis is limited to OECD countries for three reasons. Firstly, it makes the study more feasible because coding and arranging all mediation attempts for all countries consume a lot of time. Second, it increases confidence level to generalize validity of the results because these countries share enough commonalities as they are democratic countries with market economies. Also, economic indicators to test domestic vulnerability is much more available for these countries. The unit of this analysis is country-year data and in total, there are 1173 country-year observations formed by 23 countries and 51 years. Currently OECD has 35 member states, but 7 of them are excluded because they became members after 2000. Besides, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Korea and Luxembourg are excluded because they have no state mediation record between the years of 1950-2000.

In this thesis, Jacob Bercovitch's (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset is benefited as a primary source of conflict resolution behavior. ICM is a comprehensive dataset that fulfils the needs of systematic empirical data on international conflict management events.

ICM contains different international conflicts, belligerent parties and conflict management mechanisms occurred from 1945 through to 2003. These management mechanisms include mediation, negotiation, arbitration, or referral to some UN action. The dataset provides extensive information on mediation characteristics including dates, mediator strategies, duration of mediation, mediator identity and outcomes of mediation. In the dataset, 309 conflicts and 3676 conflict management attempts were coded. In the dataset, international conflict is identified as “an organized and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention to use military force involving at least one state.” (Jacob Bercovitch, 1999, p. 1). Dataset determines the characteristics of conflicts by deciding whether they pose a threat to international stability and peace or not. In addition, dataset includes internationalized civil conflicts because these conflicts have international aspects with foreign troops, refugee flows, military or economic assistance. Thus, they can be a potential threat to international stability. Apart from that, ICM dataset has a very low (less than 10) fatalities threshold when coding a conflict. These approaches give a chance to strengthen this analysis because mediation is a resolution method which can also be applied to resolve non-violent conflicts and dataset does not neglect them.

The dependent variables are the number of mediation attempts, mediator rank and position and, mediator strategy. These variables are derived from ICM dataset. The dataset assigns a third-party identity to each conflict management events. This third-party identity includes different leaders, states, national and international organizations. Selected countries for the study are identified from these third-party identity list and their variables are coded according to their identity number. Third-parties containing national and international organizations are neglected from the analysis because this study mainly focuses on state’s unique behavior across mediation opportunities. Accordingly, the number of mediations are coded according to the total number of mediation attempts annually for each state.

The second dependent variable of this thesis is the mediator rank and position which can be an important factor in the mediation process because different types of mediators provide different capabilities, motivations and intervention styles. Mediator influences the outcome by using his resources, leverage capacity or political authority over conflicted parties. In addition, mediator’s rank or position identify the flexibility of management efforts; thus, it has an important effect on the success of mediation (Jacob Bercovitch, 1999, p. 190). Taking into consideration of all these

reasons, ICM dataset has a broad range of mediator identity as can be seen in Table 4. There are three main categories: private individuals, organizations and states. Also, the rank of mediators is separated as leaders and senior/lower level representatives. In this study, only state mediation is taken into consideration. States have a different political, economic, and military influence in the international system. Therefore, ICM dataset distinguishes states as a small and large governments according to position in the international community. Dataset benefits Cox-Jacobson scale of power relation and the Correlates of War Project's Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data to decide state power (J. Bercovitch & Fretter, 2007, p. 152). However, in this study, only leader of a small government and leader of a large government was used as a mediator type. Because it is clear that leader mediation receives the most media attention, accordingly, this might be an easy way of announcing policy success of governments publicly especially when indicators display a poor government performance in domestic politics.

Table 1: Mediator Rank and Position List from ICM dataset

(00) No mediation	(06) Leader of an international organisation
(01) Private Individual	(07) Representative of a small government
(02) National organisation	(08) Representative of a large government
(03) Representative of a regional organisation	(09) Leader of a small government
(04) Regional organisation	(10) Leader of a large government
(05) Representative of an international organisation	

The last dependent variable of this study is mediation strategy. The most common mediation strategy categorization in mediation literature is: communication-facilitation, procedural, and directive strategies (Jacob Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991). These categories demonstrate a variance from the weak to strong level intervention model. As can be seen in Table 2, Bercovitch also used this categorization in ICM dataset and specified that this mediation tactics was based on similar earlier analyses of mediator behavior such as Jones (1989), Touval and Zartman (1985), Simkin (1971) and Bercovitch et al, (1991). Communication-facilitation and procedural strategies reflect more passive tactics such as transferring of information between the parties, determining of problems and issues, arranging the meeting place, making the organization and attempting to build trust between the parties. However, directive strategy is the most active and powerful one. It is an

attractive tactic for a mediator who want to take a quick result from the process. With this strategy, a mediator generally manipulates opposing parties by showing costs and benefits of their decisions clearly. In this categorization, “offered only” mediation strategy means that mediation was offered but rejected by the parties, or someone is invited to mediate, but no action was taken. I only include directive strategy dummy variable in my dataset, because my hypotheses assume that leaders prefer to use strong intervention model to provide a success instantly in the conflict resolution when they feel vulnerable in domestic political manner.

Table 2: Mediation Strategy List from ICM Dataset

(0) No mediation	(3) Procedural
(1) Mediation Offered Only	(4) Directive
(2) Communication-Facilitation	(6) Unspecified

Real GDP growth, election year and anti-government demonstrations are included as independent variables in this study. To measure economic performance of government, real GDP growth rate is used which gives a more realistic assessment of growth rate. The data is derived from the last version of Gleditsch’s (2002) work “Expanded Trade and GDP data”. It includes GDP indicators of independent states (1950-2011) which is only available data that covers the time period of 1950-2000. Real GDP growth is the annual rate of growth of gross domestic product which are adjusted for inflation. Real GDP growth in the previous year is incorporated (in logged constant USD dollars) in the regression.

To test the effect of upcoming elections on the mediation attempts, the measure of the election year dummy is used. Cheibub’s (2007) dataset of Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (PPD) is benefited for identifying presidential and legislative elections of countries on an annual base. Election year dummy is coded as “1” for each year if there is a presidential and legislative election held in the next year and coded as “0” if there is no election held in the next year.

The other independent variable is the number of anti-government demonstrations and this data is derived from Domestic Conflict Events dataset from The Cross-National Time-Series Data (CNTS) Archive which is a data set comprised of more than 200 years of annual data from 1815

onward for over 200 countries.⁴ The frequency of anti-government demonstrations is an indicator for public disapproval of government policies. According to the dataset anti-government demonstrations are containing “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.”⁵

Moreover, different variables to control other factors that may matter for mediation attempts are accounted. These are CINC score, major power indicator, colonial power indicator, regime type, ongoing war indicator and geographical region. CINC score is The Composite Index of National Capability which statistically measures national power which ground on military personnel and expenditures, iron and steel production and energy consumption, urban and total population. This variable is controlled because it is an indicator to present state power and Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) found in their study that state power is an asset for mediator choice. Additionally, major power indicator is included as a control variable for the same reason with CINC score. COW Project’s classification of major powers, where a coding of 1 reflects a major power and 0 a minor power, is applied for this variable.⁶ I also added colonial power indicator to check whether being a colonial power has a relationship with being a mediator country or not. It is possible that a county’s former colonies encourage it to offer more mediation (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 88). The other factor that might affect to engage international mediation is regime types of countries. Melin (2013) found that state with democratic governance structure is more likely to be a mediator. This variable comes from Cheibub’s PPD dataset which is based on the effective head of government. Five types of government form are separately coded as dummy variables; parliamentary democracies, presidential democracies, civilian dictatorships, military dictatorships, and royal dictatorships. In addition, country’s war involvement is included as a control variable because it is likely that ongoing war in the country result in decreasing their mediation activities. The reason might be governments are less willing to use their available resources to other crises. Thus, this probability is controlled by including a dummy variable comes

⁴ The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) was initiated by Arthur S. Banks in 1968 and offers a listing of international and national country-data facts. The dataset contains statistical information on a range of countries, with data entries ranging from 1815 to the present. <https://www.cntsdata.com/the-data>, 12.11.2017.

⁵ <https://www.cntsdata.com/domconflict>, 12.11.2017.

⁶ Correlates of War Project. 2017. "State System Membership List, v2016." <http://correlatesofwar.org>, 13.11.2017.

from COW War Years Data⁷ and coded as “1” if there is an extra, interstate or civil war and coded as “0” if there is no war within the year. Lastly, geographical region of the country is included as a control variable to see if there is a geographical effect on decision of mediation attempts. These regions are North and South America, Europe, Asia and Middle East in the dataset and each of them coded as a dummy variable. All control variables are added in all regression models as robustness check.

In statistical terms, I expect an interaction such that domestic political issues in the country have a significant impact on country’s decision to engaging mediation activity. Large-N statistical models are applied in this thesis because it is most appropriate technique to examine a large number of cases and have a better external validity. In order to test the theoretical arguments quantitatively, linear regression model is used. In addition, the interaction effect technique is used to determine the combined effect of election with GDP growth and anti-government demonstrations on dependent variables. The interaction effect is the joint effect of independent variables on a dependent variable. The presence of an independent variable and its main effect depends on the level of another independent variable. As Stevens (1999) argued, if there is an interaction effect, it is a mistake to interpret the main effect without seeing it. That’s why it is important to analyze whether there is an impact of GDP level or anti-government demonstrations depends on the level of the election variable. The population generally accuse government due to poor economic performance and punish them in the ballot box. Moreover, as elections near it is likely that governments pay more attention to public protest to keep its incumbent position. Thus, it is expected that low GDP growth rate or anti-government demonstrations should increase the likelihood of mediation attempts when there is an upcoming election.

⁷ <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war>, 13.11.2017

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this chapter, I discuss the results of my regression analysis. I first show some descriptive statistics as a summary of the dataset. Next, I present the regression models. My unit of analysis is country-year and in all regression models, control variables are included (CINC score, regime type, ongoing war indicator, geographical region, major power and colonial power indicator). Also, I include decade and region fixed effects to control for factors that are constant within a decade or a geographical region.

Descriptive Statistics of Mediation Dataset

My dataset includes data from twenty-three OECD countries. When we look at the geographical distribution of our dataset, we see that three of these countries are in North and South America, sixteen of these are in Europe, one of them is in the Middle East and three of them are in Asia. In total, these countries made 748 mediation attempts between the years 1950 and 2000. As can be seen in Figure 4, with 381 mediation attempts, the USA takes the leadership by far. It is not surprising to see that the USA, which has been a dominant power in the unipolar world since the end of the Cold War, is the country which has engaged in the highest number of mediations. Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) also report that the USA is the most common mediator for the period 1945-1995. In addition, France and the UK are the countries that show the highest amount of mediation activity. Common characteristic of these countries is that they are powerful and colonial states. Powerful states are the most common mediator type because of their ability to provide resources and their political or economic leverage capacity (Todhunter, 2012, p.43).




Figure 5 presents the pattern of using mediation across time. A dramatic rise of mediation attempts by states took place after the year 1990. Moreover, the graph demonstrates that since the end of the Cold War, mediation has become a popular conflict resolution process. It is also an important pattern to consider when examining the regression results, because it shows that we need to account for the general increase in mediation across time. Another noteworthy point is that US and global mediation attempts show similar patterns.




Figure 6 shows that the vast majority of countries that act as mediators come from North and South America and Europe. This finding is not surprising since most of the countries that are my dataset are in these regions. What is interesting here is that, although there are fewer countries

in North and South America than Europe, the number of mediation taking place by these countries is more than those in Europe. The reason is the leadership of the USA in state mediation attempts in this period.




Figure 7a illustrates the distribution of regime types and the mediation attempts between the years 1950 and 2000 with a percentage scale. Remarkably, almost 70% of all of mediation attempts were made by presidential democracies even though these countries only make up 30% of the dataset. The reason for this might be that the USA is an outlier. Therefore, another figure (7b) is added to control the effect of the USA on the dataset. Figure 7b presents the distribution of regime type and the mediation attempts by countries in the dataset excluding the USA. As we can see, when we exclude the US, although presidential democracies make up about 20% of my dataset, they are responsible for 35% of all mediation attempts. It shows us that presidential democracies tend to launch a considerable amount of mediation attempts even without the USA effect. In addition, without the USA it can be seen more clearly that governments with parliamentary democracies launched a great deal of mediation. On the other hand, dictatorial regimes (Mexico 1950-99, Spain 1950-76, Portugal 1950-75, Poland 1950-88, Hungary 1950-89, Greece 1967-73, Turkey 1950-60 / 1980-82) hardly attempted to launch any mediation.






Figure 8 presents a comparison for the total number of mediations and the total number of anti-government demonstrations between the years 1950 and 2000. Mostly, anti-government demonstrations and mediation attempts represent very close numbers in total. However, Mexico and Spain are outliers for this pattern; although there are lots of anti-government demonstrations within these years, their mediation attempts are very few.



Regression Results

Table 3, 4 and 5 present results of linear regressions that analyze the relationship between dependent variables (number of mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage and independent variables (Real GDP growth, elections, anti-government demonstrations). Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c claim that as economic performance declines, mediation attempts should increase. The results indicate that when all other variables held equal, the GDP growth has no significant effect on mediation frequency (Table 3). This result prevents us from making strong claims about GDP growth and mediation. However, even if the results are not statistically significant, it is seen that there is a positive correlation. Perhaps, political leaders tend to see an opportunity to conduct a mediation activity when their country's economic performance increases. However, regression results show no support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c.

Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c claim that as the election is approaching, leaders are more prone to announce their policy success publicly in order to gain popularity. Being a mediator is one of the least risky choices for a leader who wants to draw attention to foreign policy. So, I expect that as elections become closer, number of mediations, leader mediation and directive mediation strategies to increase. As can be seen in Table 4, number of mediation attempts and leader mediation have a positive correlation with coming elections, which means that leaders see mediation as an opportunity for policy success as elections come near. However, the number of directive strategy usage has a negative correlation with elections, which means that leaders are not interested in being a mediator when elections approach. These relationships are not statically significant; therefore, the results suggest that, we cannot say with confidence that election years have an effect on mediation attempts.

Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c focus on the link between public approval for government and mediation behavior. If there are more anti-government demonstrations, leaders might feel domestically vulnerable. For this reason, it is expected that leaders have incentives to prove their ability to solve an international issue or being a leader country in the conflict settlement. Leading a mediation attempt can provide a powerful image about government power and its management skills. Therefore, it is expected that as the number of anti-government demonstrations rise, mediation attempts also increase. However, the regression presents the opposite relation. Table 5

provides strong evidence that the impact of anti-government demonstrations on mediation behavior is negative, which means that if demonstrations against government are rising, mediation activities are decreasing. Thus, these results cannot provide a support for Hypothesis 3a, 3b and 3c.

In Table 6, I ran a regression that includes all three key independent variables. As it can be seen, the results are consistent with other regression results. These results reveal one more time that GDP growth and elections have no significant impact on mediation attempts. Moreover, anti-government demonstrations have a strong negative effect on mediation attempts. It shows that when government are faced with strong public disapproval, they are less likely to care about other countries' conflicts.

Table 3: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00807 (0.0160)	0.00268 (0.00201)	0.00480 (0.00682)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.212 (0.324)	-0.0203 (0.0322)	-0.0941 (0.121)
Presidential Regimes	0.422 (0.400)	0.0227 (0.0395)	0.115 (0.150)
Ongoing War	-0.381 (0.339)	-0.0535 (0.0527)	-0.230 (0.145)
CINC Score	16.14*** (5.389)	2.072*** (0.556)	6.254*** (2.030)
Major Power	2.100** (0.816)	0.228** (0.0927)	0.837** (0.321)
Colonial Power	0.0102 (0.0171)	0.00220 (0.00220)	-0.000758 (0.00729)
Constant	-0.956 (0.574)	-0.0865 (0.0606)	-0.301 (0.213)
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098
R-squared	0.292	0.138	0.252
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.			

Table 4: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Election	-0.0122 (0.0539)	-0.000494 (0.0217)	-0.0219 (0.0228)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.204 (0.329)	-0.0190 (0.0340)	-0.0869 (0.121)
Presidential Regimes	0.450 (0.406)	0.0274 (0.0387)	0.131 (0.150)
Ongoing War	-0.370 (0.306)	-0.0495 (0.0490)	-0.225 (0.133)
CINC Score	12.98** (6.093)	1.659** (0.659)	5.247** (2.233)
Major Power	2.154** (0.878)	0.234** (0.101)	0.851** (0.340)
Colonial Power	0.00975 (0.0163)	0.00208 (0.00211)	-0.000825 (0.00707)
Constant	-0.929 (0.541)	-0.0760 (0.0567)	-0.280 (0.193)
Observations	1,138	1,138	1,138
R-squared	0.282	0.129	0.245

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 5: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Demonstrations

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0797** (0.0334)	-0.00684*** (0.00137)	-0.0281*** (0.00823)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.258 (0.326)	-0.0235 (0.0321)	-0.110 (0.121)
Presidential Regimes	0.401 (0.410)	0.0233 (0.0413)	0.107 (0.152)
Ongoing War	-0.282 (0.220)	-0.0419 (0.0435)	-0.195* (0.107)
CINC Score	15.39*** (5.407)	1.867*** (0.651)	6.087*** (2.116)
Major Power	2.153** (0.859)	0.233** (0.0992)	0.852** (0.334)
Colonial Power	0.0111 (0.0161)	0.00220 (0.00207)	-0.000349 (0.00702)
Constant	-1.043 (0.626)	-0.0865 (0.0627)	-0.320 (0.220)
Observations	1,132	1,132	1,132
R-squared	0.287	0.131	0.250

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 6: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00749 (0.0163)	0.00261 (0.00257)	0.00462 (0.00690)
Election	-0.0132 (0.0525)	0.0130 (0.0243)	-0.0243 (0.0242)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0961** (0.0376)	-0.00891*** (0.00108)	-0.0335*** (0.00953)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.273 (0.323)	0.00726 (0.0542)	-0.111 (0.118)
Presidential Regimes	0.367 (0.390)	0.0489 (0.0690)	0.103 (0.147)
Ongoing War	-0.273 (0.236)	-0.0542 (0.0551)	-0.193 (0.113)
CINC Score	19.47*** (4.545)	2.090** (0.983)	7.426*** (1.862)
Major Power	2.087** (0.788)	0.236** (0.0975)	0.832** (0.312)
Colonial Power	0.0119 (0.0168)	0.00274 (0.00220)	-0.000156 (0.00724)
Constant	-1.069 (0.671)	-0.143 (0.106)	-0.336 (0.244)
Observations	1,092	907	1,092
R-squared	0.300	0.144	0.258

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Previous analyses tested the effect of a single domestic political factor on number of total mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage in mediation. However, I further tested the interaction effect of elections with other independent variables. Tables 7 and 8 show the results of these models. In previous analyses, I found that GDP growth and elections have no statistically significant effect on mediation attempts. It can only be said that GDP growth and mediation attempts are positively correlated with each other, which means that governments have more self-confidence to be a leader country in a conflict management if their economic performance is high. On the other hand, results show that upcoming elections make states engage in more mediation. Interactions between these two independent variables, as Table 7 displays, show that their effect on mediation behavior is not statically significant. When elections approach and GDP growth scores is low, leaders do not prefer to attempt mediation. Therefore, Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c are not supported.

As previous regression results show, the likelihood of attempting mediation is low when there are anti-government demonstrations in the country and this relation is statistically significant. It demonstrates the opposite of Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. However, the strong correlation cannot be observed when there is an upcoming election while government is faced with demonstrations (Table 8). The regression does not show consistent results, except showing significant negative correlation with number of leader mediation. This means that the number of leader mediation decreases when the probability of upcoming elections and anti-government demonstrations increases. This result fails to provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c.

Table 7: Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00815 (0.0131)	0.00273 (0.00176)	0.00444 (0.00583)
Election	-0.0172 (0.127)	0.00181 (0.0153)	-0.0329 (0.0562)
Election # Real GDP Growth	-0.000325 (0.0296)	-0.000233 (0.00313)	0.00175 (0.0128)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.207 (0.327)	-0.0205 (0.0340)	-0.0881 (0.121)
Presidential Regimes	0.428 (0.392)	0.0224 (0.0376)	0.124 (0.147)
Ongoing War	-0.381 (0.338)	-0.0535 (0.0526)	-0.230 (0.144)
CINC Score	16.16*** (5.411)	2.071*** (0.565)	6.271*** (2.031)
Major Power	2.099** (0.820)	0.228** (0.0936)	0.836** (0.323)
Colonial Power	0.00990 (0.0170)	0.00219 (0.00221)	-0.000839 (0.00730)
Constant	-0.954 (0.562)	-0.0868 (0.0605)	-0.297 (0.206)
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098
R-squared	0.292	0.138	0.252

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 8: Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Election	-0.000927 (0.0487)	0.0108 (0.0277)	-0.0199 (0.0261)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0755* (0.0428)	-0.000906 (0.00335)	-0.0276** (0.0106)
Election # Anti-Government Dem.	-0.00778 (0.0235)	-0.0110** (0.00418)	-0.000805 (0.00748)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.255 (0.330)	-0.0229 (0.0342)	-0.105 (0.120)
Presidential Regimes	0.405 (0.402)	0.0246 (0.0391)	0.114 (0.150)
Ongoing War	-0.283 (0.220)	-0.0432 (0.0465)	-0.195* (0.107)
CINC Score	15.40*** (5.462)	1.874** (0.692)	6.099*** (2.123)
Major Power	2.150** (0.864)	0.231** (0.0996)	0.850** (0.335)
Colonial Power	0.0110 (0.0162)	0.00209 (0.00209)	-0.000365 (0.00705)
Constant	-1.045 (0.623)	-0.0907 (0.0648)	-0.318 (0.220)
Observations	1,132	1,132	1,132
R-squared	0.287	0.132	0.250
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.			

I ran other regressions to look into the relationship between mediation attempts and my key independent variables excluding the US from the sample. The models and control variables are the same excluding the USA. As we see in Figures 7a and 7b, the USA has a unique position due to its high level of mediation involvement. There might be many different reasons for this; the USA was mostly concerned about Soviet Russia's third-party interventions because these could be a way of enhancing the Soviet influence (Touval, 1992, p. 233). The other reason might be that the economic, military and political interests of the USA in the world affairs are very critical for their government; accordingly, they are more prone to mediate international conflict to keep international stability (Touval, 1992, p. 246). It is also clear that the USA is a powerful actor who has a lot of military and economic resources. It is important to make all regressions again without USA to see if there will be a change in the results.

Tables 9 and 10 provide the regression results that all other variables held equal, real GDP growth and upcoming elections present the same results with previous analysis. Neither factor is statistically significant on mediation involvement of states.

However, a notable change can be found by looking at the anti-government demonstration variable (Table 11). Although anti-government demonstrations provide strong and negative correlation with mediation attempts in the previous results, without the USA, this variable also becomes insignificant. It provides an evidence that the US mediation attempts are less likely when there is strong public disapproval.

In Table 12, all independent variables are included in the regression. This table again shows us that without USA none of my key independent variables are significant. Regressions show the same results as the other tables that excluding the USA.

Moreover, the analysis of the interaction between election and the level of real GDP growth does not show a strong relationship without the USA (Table 13), which is consistent with previous analysis. In Table 11, it can be seen that anti-government demonstrations have no significant effect on mediation attempts without the USA. Another test was implemented to control this result by adding upcoming elections. Table 14 represents regression results and it can be seen that elections have no significant effect on mediation attempts even if there is an uprising against government. Tables 13 and 14 show no support for Hypothesis 4a, 4b and 4c.

Table 9: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00401 (0.00946)	0.00173 (0.00122)	0.00242 (0.00386)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0429 (0.0976)	-0.00426 (0.0137)	-0.0312 (0.0339)
Presidential Regimes	0.0124 (0.136)	-0.0136 (0.0148)	-0.0333 (0.0524)
Ongoing War	-0.0147 (0.0813)	0.00951 (0.0236)	-0.0736 (0.0428)
CINC Score	-3.951 (4.839)	0.569 (0.421)	-0.934 (1.379)
Major Power	1.789*** (0.262)	0.175*** (0.0348)	0.709*** (0.106)
Colonial Power	0.00849 (0.0117)	0.00225 (0.00166)	-0.00157 (0.00593)
Constant	-0.215 (0.130)	-0.0156 (0.0177)	-0.0337 (0.0609)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050
R-squared	0.277	0.108	0.184

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 10: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election Excluding the USA

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Election	-0.0613 (0.0414)	-0.0147 (0.0176)	-0.0260 (0.0221)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0356 (0.0997)	-0.000969 (0.0135)	-0.0273 (0.0322)
Presidential Regimes	0.0337 (0.134)	-0.00678 (0.0187)	-0.0228 (0.0480)
Ongoing War	-0.0414 (0.0901)	0.00807 (0.0236)	-0.0826* (0.0458)
CINC Score	-4.724 (5.021)	0.444 (0.384)	-1.087 (1.408)
Major Power	1.759*** (0.268)	0.169*** (0.0364)	0.696*** (0.108)
Colonial Power	0.00794 (0.0114)	0.00212 (0.00164)	-0.00167 (0.00580)
Constant	-0.186 (0.145)	-0.00636 (0.0187)	-0.0216 (0.0554)
Observations	1,088	1,088	1,088
R-squared	0.273	0.102	0.183

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 11: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Dem. Excluding the USA

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Anti-Government Dem.	0.0280 (0.0361)	-0.00169 (0.00236)	-0.000438 (0.0135)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0311 (0.0829)	-0.00590 (0.0139)	-0.0343 (0.0319)
Presidential Regimes	0.0325 (0.143)	-0.0131 (0.0166)	-0.0324 (0.0539)
Ongoing War	-0.0407 (0.0875)	0.00836 (0.0232)	-0.0819* (0.0453)
CINC Score	-5.575 (5.000)	0.493 (0.388)	-1.083 (1.389)
Major Power	1.750*** (0.270)	0.170*** (0.0369)	0.697*** (0.110)
Colonial Power	0.00734 (0.0112)	0.00213 (0.00165)	-0.00170 (0.00575)
Constant	-0.231 (0.149)	-0.0108 (0.0215)	-0.0343 (0.0575)
Observations	1,082	1,082	1,082
R-squared	0.273	0.101	0.182

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 12: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding the USA			
VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00405 (0.00932)	0.00161 (0.00166)	0.00240 (0.00382)
Election	-0.0595 (0.0444)	-0.00433 (0.0186)	-0.0252 (0.0223)
Anti-Government Dem.	0.0264 (0.0360)	-0.000851 (0.00325)	-0.000987 (0.0137)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.00863 (0.0887)	0.0297* (0.0154)	-0.0262 (0.0284)
Presidential Regimes	0.0514 (0.137)	0.0177 (0.0199)	-0.0261 (0.0514)
Ongoing War	-0.0160 (0.0791)	0.0221 (0.0377)	-0.0735* (0.0427)
CINC Score	-4.801 (4.754)	0.628 (0.440)	-0.916 (1.351)
Major Power	1.777*** (0.264)	0.167*** (0.0381)	0.709*** (0.107)
Colonial Power	0.00782 (0.0115)	0.00252 (0.00169)	-0.00160 (0.00589)
Constant	-0.246* (0.135)	-0.0611** (0.0236)	-0.0395 (0.0633)
Observations	1,044	859	1,044
R-squared	0.278	0.114	0.185
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.			

Table 13: Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Election	-0.0458 (0.125)	-0.00847 (0.0137)	-0.0164 (0.0367)
Real GDP Growth	0.00469 (0.00781)	0.00195 (0.00134)	0.00288 (0.00405)
Election # Real GDP Growth	-0.00296 (0.0245)	-0.00103 (0.00211)	-0.00209 (0.00892)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0284 (0.0992)	-0.00102 (0.0141)	-0.0248 (0.0302)
Presidential Regimes	0.0327 (0.132)	-0.00897 (0.0183)	-0.0242 (0.0483)
Ongoing War	-0.0161 (0.0814)	0.00916 (0.0239)	-0.0743 (0.0433)
CINC Score	-3.908 (4.822)	0.585 (0.404)	-0.901 (1.360)
Major Power	1.786*** (0.260)	0.174*** (0.0351)	0.708*** (0.106)
Colonial Power	0.00856 (0.0117)	0.00227 (0.00166)	0.00227 (0.00166)
Constant	-0.211 (0.137)	-0.0151 (0.0174)	-0.0327 (0.0629)
Observations	1,050	1,050	1,050
R-squared	0.277	0.108	0.185

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 14: Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations Excluding the USA

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Election	-0.115* (0.0565)	-0.0178 (0.0173)	-0.0467 (0.0385)
Anti-Government Dem.	0.0151 (0.0227)	-0.00239 (0.00261)	-0.00538 (0.00934)
Election # Anti-Government Dem.	0.0820 (0.0948)	0.00449 (0.00403)	0.0315 (0.0348)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.00576 (0.0786)	-0.00169 (0.0143)	-0.0240 (0.0271)
Presidential Regimes	0.0661 (0.143)	-0.00743 (0.0198)	-0.0186 (0.0524)
Ongoing War	-0.0417 (0.0876)	0.00825 (0.0236)	-0.0823* (0.0452)
CINC Score	-5.763 (5.018)	0.481 (0.387)	-1.156 (1.393)
Major Power	1.746*** (0.265)	0.170*** (0.0367)	0.695*** (0.108)
Colonial Power	0.00756 (0.0111)	0.00215 (0.00164)	-0.00160 (0.00577)
Constant	-0.211 (0.146)	-0.00843 (0.0207)	-0.0264 (0.0573)
Observations	1,082	1,082	1,082
R-squared	0.275	0.102	0.184

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

As we see in Figure 7a and 7b, democracies constitute a majority in my dataset and democratic countries are the most preferred mediators. Therefore, I ran a regression only with democratic countries to purify the results from non-democratic period of OECD countries. This regression includes mediation attempts and all independent variables (Table 15). The results are the same with previous analyses; real GDP growth and upcoming elections are not statistically significant factors on mediation attempts and only anti-government demonstrations present strong but negative relationship with independent variables.

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.00749 (0.0163)	0.00261 (0.00257)	0.00462 (0.00690)
Election	-0.0132 (0.0525)	0.0130 (0.0243)	-0.0243 (0.0242)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0961** (0.0376)	-0.00891*** (0.00108)	-0.0335*** (0.00953)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.273 (0.323)	0.00726 (0.0542)	-0.111 (0.118)
Presidential Regimes	0.367 (0.390)	0.0489 (0.0690)	0.103 (0.147)
Ongoing War	-0.273 (0.236)	-0.0542 (0.0551)	-0.193 (0.113)
CINC Score	19.47*** (4.545)	2.090** (0.983)	7.426*** (1.862)
Major Power	2.087** (0.788)	0.236** (0.0975)	0.832** (0.312)
Colonial Power	0.0119 (0.0168)	0.00274 (0.00220)	-0.000156 (0.00724)
Constant	-1.069 (0.671)	-0.143 (0.106)	-0.336 (0.244)
Observations	1,092	907	1,092
R-squared	0.300	0.144	0.258

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

After I measure the relationship between mediation attempts and the independent variables in democratic countries, I decided to make regressions separately for Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies to see the difference. Table 16 includes regression results for the relationship between mediation attempts and all independent variables in Presidential Regimes and Table 17 only includes variables for Parliamentary Regimes. As we see in both tables, real GDP growth, Elections and Anti-Government Demonstrations have no statistically significant relationship with mediation attempts.

Table 16: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Presidential Regimes			
VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.0505 (0.202)	0.00491 (0.0351)	0.0672 (0.0854)
Election	-0.0229 (0.329)	0.0449 (0.106)	-0.236* (0.0717)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0466 (0.0179)	-0.00324 (0.00334)	-0.00236 (0.00981)
Ongoing War	-0.728* (0.234)	-0.186 (0.0646)	-0.464*** (0.0452)
CINC Score	-51.10* (13.91)	-4.742 (2.731)	-23.66*** (2.287)
Major Power	4.755** (0.612)	0.495** (0.0564)	1.733** (0.214)
Colonial Power	-	-	-
Constant	-2.534 (2.549)	-0.308 (0.529)	-0.304 (0.468)
Observations	114	114	114
R-squared	0.540	0.234	0.496
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.			

Table 17: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Parliamentary Regimes			
VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.0157 (0.0227)	0.00543 (0.00314)	0.00660 (0.0103)
Election	-0.152* (0.0745)	0.00681 (0.0370)	-0.0502 (0.0374)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0156 (0.0289)	-0.00220 (0.00471)	-0.0233 (0.0195)
Ongoing War	-0.129 (0.115)	0.0208 (0.0307)	-0.134* (0.0690)
CINC Score	-3.664 (4.008)	0.948 (0.608)	-1.252 (1.403)
Major Power	1.139 (0.775)	-0.00300 (0.117)	0.766 (0.439)
Colonial Power	0.00894 (0.0136)	0.00307 (0.00211)	-0.00272 (0.00722)
Constant	-0.274 (0.424)	-0.0457 (0.0538)	0.0369 (0.215)
Observations	445	444	445
R-squared	0.305	0.124	0.200
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.			

Figure 4 shows us that between 1950 and 2000, most of the mediation attempts were made by to the USA, France and United Kingdom. Therefore, I ran a regression includes the variables only for these three countries. Table 18 present the results of this regression. Real GDP growth and election do not represent statistically consistent relationship. Some models show positive and significant relationship between variables while others do not and this prevents us from making a strong claim about the relationship between mediation attempts and real GDP growth and election. However, anti-government relationship has strong and negative relationship just like previous analysis. It means when anti-government demonstrations increase, the probability of mediation attempts decrease in the USA, France and United Kingdom. Also, in Table 19, I made a regression

for the rest of the countries excluding the USA, France and United Kingdom. The results remained the same, only anti-government demonstrations present strong and negative relationship with independent variables.

Table 18: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in USA, UK and France

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.0430 (0.0341)	0.00754* (0.00394)	0.0209 (0.0143)
Election	-0.105 (0.0737)	0.00111 (0.0367)	-0.0835* (0.0432)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0953*** (0.0225)	-0.00861*** (0.00120)	-0.0325*** (0.00569)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0752 (0.222)	0.000682 (0.0356)	-0.0712 (0.0767)
Presidential Regimes	0.0301 (0.677)	-0.00135 (0.0990)	-0.0955 (0.226)
Ongoing War	-0.464 (0.282)	-0.0638 (0.0510)	-0.279** (0.127)
CINC Score	-38.38** (17.09)	-3.369 (2.050)	-14.47** (6.519)
Major Power	1.828* (1.008)	0.159 (0.136)	0.897** (0.400)
Colonial Power	0.0119 (0.0168)	0.00237 (0.00215)	-0.000156 (0.00724)
Constant	-0.0881 (0.644)	0.0512 (0.0822)	0.116 (0.265)
Observations	620	620	620
R-squared	0.432	0.193	0.369

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Table 19: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding USA, UK and France

VARIABLES	(1) N of Total Mediations	(2) N of Total Leader Mediations	(3) N of Directive Strategy Usage
Real GDP Growth	0.0430 (0.0341)	0.00754* (0.00394)	0.0209 (0.0143)
Election	-0.105 (0.0737)	0.00111 (0.0367)	-0.0835* (0.0432)
Anti-Government Dem.	-0.0953*** (0.0225)	-0.00861*** (0.00120)	-0.0325*** (0.00569)
Parliamentary Regimes	-0.0752 (0.222)	0.000682 (0.0356)	-0.0712 (0.0767)
Presidential Regimes	0.0301 (0.677)	-0.00135 (0.0990)	-0.0955 (0.226)
Ongoing War	-0.464 (0.282)	-0.0638 (0.0510)	-0.279** (0.127)
CINC Score	-38.38** (17.09)	-3.369 (2.050)	-14.47** (6.519)
Major Power	1.828* (1.008)	0.159 (0.136)	0.897** (0.400)
Colonial Power	0.0119 (0.0168)	0.00237 (0.00215)	-0.000156 (0.00724)
Constant	-0.0881 (0.644)	0.0512 (0.0822)	0.116 (0.265)
Observations	620	620	620
R-squared	0.432	0.193	0.369

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table.

Referring to an earlier literature, a series of control variables (CINC score, regime type, ongoing war indicator, geographical region, major power and colonial power indicator) were examined to see whether the models are plausible or not. Control variables including region and decade fixed effects are included in all regressions. Their results are consistent across all regression models. Regression results of control variables present some interesting findings. All regression models with control variables are included in the supplementary appendix.

The results show that National Capability score (CINC) has a statistically significant and positive correlation with the number of mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage. By looking at this result, we can say that engaging in a mediation process has a strong correlation with government's leverage. Results also show that the coefficient for the major power indicator is positive in all models, which means that major powers are more likely to attempt mediation. States with greater capabilities are able to engage in more mediation. Apart from these results, regression analysis found evidence that Middle East Region variable is strongly correlated with the number of mediation and leader mediation. We do not observe this pattern for directive strategy usage variable. In my dataset, there is only one country from Middle East which is Turkey. Other control variables are not statistically significant.

I also include a decade variable to capture possible decade effect. In all regression models, results show that the 1990s decade are statistically significant, implying that, other things held equal, in 1990s mediation attempts increased. Therefore, the result captures a common factor that affects all countries in that time period. It is already known, in the post-Cold War period, mediation has become a popular conflict resolution method (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b; Todhunter, 2012).

Control variables in the regression models excluding the USA show us mostly same results with the other regressions. The most notable difference is that CINC score is not a significant factor for mediation attempts according to these results. It means the USA changes the effect of the CINC score variable. However, being a major power is still an important predictor of mediation. Also, the 1990s-decade variable is still strongly correlated with mediation attempts. As with previous regression models, other control variables are not statistically significant.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I evaluate the hypothesis that third-party mediation attempts by countries are shaped by their domestic political situations. My findings do not support this hypothesis. There is no evidence to suggest that when government performs poorly, leaders are more likely to become a mediator. I found a strong negative relationship between anti-government demonstrations and mediation attempts, which is contrary to my hypothesis. My empirical results show that if there are anti-government demonstrations in a country, then that country becomes less likely to attempt mediation elsewhere. Although the regression results are not supportive for my hypotheses, this thesis contributes to the literature in some ways. First, I show that being a major power in international arena has a strong relationship with being a mediator country. Second, I provide evidence that the USA has a unique mediator position for engaging in international conflicts. In addition, the results show that there was a general rise of mediation attempts in 1990s.

There may be a number of reasons for why I do not find a relationship between domestic factors and mediation attempts. First, the operationalization of my dependent and independent variables might not appropriate for my regression analyses. Second, I might be using the wrong indicators for domestic performance of governments from the beginning. For example, I analyzed the number of anti-government demonstration as a public approval indicator because there is no consistent public approval dataset cross nationally. However, Todhunter (2012) used public approval rates from Gallup survey data when analyze the US mediation attempts. Therefore, the results might be different with better data and better operationalization.

Despite the weak evidence, this study contributes to the literature. This study reveals that the literature on foreign policy and mediation is needed to bring together. There are few studies

that address third-party mediation as an instrument of foreign policy. However, it is important to examine mediation from this approach because then we will have better understanding of what motivates countries to become a mediator. In addition, this study reflects only OECD countries' experience. It would also be useful to expand the range of countries and years for more generalized results.

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